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REVIEW OF DRIVERS' LICENSES
may be able to avoid the sanctions of section 8,(a) (5) and still com-
municate his bad-faith intentions to his employees if section 8(c) pre-
cludes any evidence of such communications. Thus, if he is able to per-
suade the courts to adhere strictly to the language of section 8 (c), he has
safely avoided the duty imposed by the NLRA to bargain in good faith.
If he cannot persuade a court to preclude use of this evidence at the hear-
ing of an 8(a) (5) charge, he will have to rely solely on his "hard bar-
gaining" at the negotiations; and this alternative is less likely to bring
about capitulation of the union and more likely to effectuate the policies
of the NLRA. Judges Kaufman and Waterman, by consciously balancing
the interests of the parties, have adopted the only feasible method for
protecting the policies embodied by the Act.
KENNETH B. Hipp
Medical Problems in the Law-Automobiles-Reporting Patients for
Review of Drivers' Licenses
A person licensed to drive a motor vehicle by the State of North Caro-
lina may lose this privilege' if he is adjudged incompetent, is admitted
as an inpatient to an institution for the treatment of the mentally ill, or
enters an institution for the treatment of alcoholism or drug addiction.2
' "A license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege in the nature of a right
of which the licensee may not be deprived save in the manner and upon the
conditions prescribed by statute." Underwood v. Howland, 274 N.C. 473, 476,
164 S.E.2d 2, 5 (1968), qutotiig from lit re Wright, 228 N.C. 584, 589, 46 S.E.2d
696, 699-700 (1948).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-17.1 (Supp. 1969) in pertinent 'part provides:
(a) The Commissioner, upon receipt of notice that any person has been
legally adjudged incompetent or has been admitted as an inpatient to an in-
stitution for the treatment of the mentally ill or has entered an institution
for the treatment of alcoholism or drug addiction shall forthwith make in-
quiry into the facts for the purpose of determining whether such person is
competent to operate a motor vehicle. Unless the Commissioner is satisfied
that such person is competent to operate a motor vehicle with safety to per-
sons and property, he shall revoke such person's driving privilege. No driv-
ing privilege revoked hereunder shall be restored unless and until the
Commissioner is satisfied that the person is competent to operate a motor
vehicle with safety to persons and property.
(c) The person in charge of every institution of. any nature for the
care and treatment of the mentally ill, the care and treatment of alcoholics
or habitual users of narcotic drugs shall forthwith report to the Commissioner
in sufficient detail for accurate identification the admission of every person.
(e) Notwithstanding the provisions of G.S. 8-53, G.S. 8-53.2, G.S. 122-8.1
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Those in charge of institutions treating these conditions are required to
report admissions to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles.8 The original
legislation in this area of reporting and revocation was enacted in 1947,
4
and was substantially amended and put in its present form in North
Carolina General Statutes, section 20-17.1, in 1969. There was little com-
pliance with the provisions of the former statute concerning reporting, and
no significant increase in reporting has been noted under the current
enactment.5 The latest amendment has accomplished desirable changes in
the law; some additional improvements should be considered. These in-
clude amendments to effect a more equal application of the statute and to
establish a discretionary system of reporting in certain situations.
The original legislation required that the Commissioner "forthwith
revoke [the] license" upon receipt of notice of admission to an appropri-
ate institution or of adjudication of incompetency unless the individual had
since been adjudged competent or discharged with a certificate of com-
petency." The present law, however, requires the Commissioner, upon
receiving notice, to inquire into the facts for the purpose of determining
driving competency. Unless he is satisfied that a person is competent to
drive with safety, the Commissioner is required to revoke the license.'
Thus, the Commissioner is now vested with some discretion; before the
amendment in 1969, he had none. This element of discretion is important
for purposes of judicial review since the right of appeal to the courts
is not available if the revocation or cancellation of the license is man-
datory.8
and G.S. 122-8.2, the person or persons in charge of any institution as set
out in subparagraph (c) hereinabove shall furnish such information as may
be required for the effective enforcement of this section. Information
furnished to the Department of Motor Vehicles as provided herein shall be
confidential and the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall be subject to the
same penalties and is granted the same protection as is the Department,
institution or individual furnishing such information. No criminal or
civil action may be brought against any person or agency who shall pro-
vide or submit to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles or his authorized
agents the information as required herein.
(f) Revocations under this section may be reviewed as provided in
G.S. 20-9(g) (4).
8Id. § 20-17.1(c).
Ch. 1006, § 9,[1947] N.C. Sess. L. 1417.
'Interview with Edward H. Wade, Director, Driver License Div., N.C. Dep't
of Motor Vehicles, in Raleigh, N.C., Mar. 4, 1970. Mr. Wade estimated that no
more than ten per cent of reportable admissions are actually reported.
'Ch. 1006, § 9(a), [1947] N.C. Sess. L. 1417.
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-17.1 (a) (Supp. 1969).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §20-25 (1965) provides in part: "Any person denied a
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The new statute, unlike the former, also provides for an elaborate
administrative review of revocations' before a board consisting primarily
of medical specialists.1 0 Another improvement of the current enactment
is that it grants immunity to all those persons reporting the required
information;" the former statute did not. Indeed, the argument might
have been made before the latest amendment, that physicians were not
allowed to disclose admissions to institutions because such action would
have involved divulgence of information "acquired in attending a
patient."'
12
It is elementary that regulation of the operation of motor vehicles
is a valid exercise of a state's police power in the furtherance of the safety
and welfare of its citizens.'3  Still, there are constitutional questions to
consider. Since the present statute does not require summary revocation
by the Commissioner and any loss of license is reviewable both admin-
istratively and judicially, this legislation should satisfy the requirements of
due process of the fourteenth amendment.' 4 Whether the demands of the
equal protection clause are likewise met is not as clear.
license or whose license has been cancelled, suspended or revoked by the Depart-
ment, except where such cancellation is mandatory under the provisions of this
article, shall have a right to file a petition ... for a hearing ... in the superior
court.. . ." (emphasis added). See Carmichael v. Scheidt, 249 N.C. 472, 476, 106
S.E.2d 685, 688 (1959) ; Fox v. Scheidt, 241 N.C. 31, 34, 84 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1954).*N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-17.1(f) (Supp. 1969).
"0 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-9(g) (4) (Supp. 1969).
" Id. § 20-17.1 (e).
12 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1969) provides:
No person, duly authorized to practice physic or surgery, shall be re-
quired to disclose any information which he may have acquired in attend-
ing a patient in a professional character, and which information was neces-
sary to enable him to prescribe for such patient as a physician, or to do
any act for him as a surgeon: Provided, that the court, either at the trial
or prior thereto, may compel such disclosure, if in his opinion the same
is necessary to a proper administration of justice.
Query whether this prohibition applied to the reporting of patients admitted for
treatment. In any case, reporting is now required "[n]otvithstanding the pro-
visions of G.S. 8-53." N.C. GEN. STAT. §20-17.1(e) (Supp. 1969).
"See South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177
(1938).
" In addition, the procedures adopted by the Department of Motor Vehicles
for the initial review of the records of reported drivers generally reflect a pre-
sumption of competency to drive unless a reasonable ground exists for con-
cluding otherwise. For example, if a person reported as an alcoholic patient
has no history of having driven after consuming alcoholic beverages, no medical
evaluation is required upon his release. On the other hand, if the patient's driving
record shows evidence of his having driven after consumption of alcoholic beverages,
a medical evaluation is required upon his release, and the Commissioner is furnished
with a copy of the patient's medical summary. Interview with Edward H. Wade,
supra note 5.
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The classification made by the statute must be reasonable to satisfy
the constitutional mandate of equal protection. 5 Thus, the legislation
should equally affect "all persons who are similarly situated with respect
to the purpose of the law."' 6 The obvious purpose of section 20-17.1 is
to promote highway safety by removing drivers who are unsafe. There-
fore, the statute's scheme of classification should be expected reasonably
to contribute to these objectives, and there should be no unreasonable
exclusions from its application.
It cannot be denied that a considerably high percentage of fatal auto-
mobile accidents and traffic violations involve drinking drivers17 and the
mentally ill.' It is also fairly well established that the alcoholic, and not
the social drinker, is the major problem.'" The drug addict, too, is a
hazardous user of the highways."0
"' "[T]he classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon
some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object
of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated
alike." F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
" Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV.
341, 346 (1949).17 J. WALLER, GUIDE FOR THE IDENTIFICATION, EVALUATION AND REGULATION
OF PERSONS WITH MEDICAL HANDICAPS TO DRIVING 3, 23 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as WALLER] (indicating that alcohol is involved in fifty to seventy-five per cent of
all severe and fatal traffic accidents); Univ. of N.C. News Bureau, News Release
No. 1515, Nov. 10, 1969 ("Seventy-eight percent of the automobile drivers killed in
single-car vehicle crashes in North Carolina during September and October were
under the influence of alcohol according to figures released.., by the State Med-
ical Examiner."); AMA Committee on Medical Aspects of Automobile Injuries
and Deaths, Medical Guide for Physicians in Determining Fitness to Drive a
Motor Vehicle, 169 J.A.M.A. 1195 (1959); Borkenstein, Alcohol and Traffic
Safety, in LAW, MEDICINE, SCIENCE-AND JUSTICE 382, 398-99 (L. Bear ed. 1964) ;
Waller, King, Nielson & Turkel, Alcohol and other Factors in California High-
way Fatalities, 14 J. FOR. Sci. 429, 442 (1969).
" WALLER 3, 25-28; Brandaleone, Blaney, Irwin, Kuhn, Miller, Penalver,
Seth, Sim & Friedman, Recommendations for Medical Standards for Motor Ve-
hicle Drivers, 26 IND. MED. & SURG. 25, 30 (1957) (The authors list the follow-
ing as probable non-acceptable conditions for one who drives: psychosis; mod-
erate severe chronic psychoneurosis; severe transient psychoneurosis (situational);
marked character, behavioral or personality disorder that prevents good adjust-
ment, such as antisocial tendencies, overt homosexuality, chronic alcoholism, or
drug addiction; marked mental deficiency; and perversion.); Crancer & Quiring,
The Mentally Ill as Motor Vehicle Operators, 126 AM. J. Psy. 807, 807-09 (1969).1°E.g., WALLER 23.
20 Conclusive research on this point is lacking. One survey showed that per-
sons convicted for illegal possession or use of drugs were not involved in more
accidents than non-drug users of the same age; however, the drug users had
nearly twice as many traffic violations. WALLER 28-29. It is important to dif-
ferentiate between "users" and "addicts." Those truly addicted are thought by
medical personnel to be greater than average accident risks. Id. See Brandaleone,
supra note 18.
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But neither can it be doubted that many persons whose mental and
physical condition does not warrant revocation of their licenses are required
by the statute to be reported. Thus, if the Commissioner was under the
obligation to revoke the license of everyone reported, the statute would
be open to attack for overbreadth. The 1969 amendment should avoid
the weakness of overinclusiveness because it vests the Commissioner with
discretion not to revoke as well as providing for an opportunity of admin-
istrative and judicial review if the Commissioner decides upon revocation.
At the same time, many drivers whose records should be reviewed will
avoid scrutinization simply because they have not been adjudged in-
competent or have not been admitted to institutions for treatment of
alcoholism or drug addiction.
Does the omission of this latter group render the statute unconstitu-
tional as a denial of equal protection? In Buck v. Bell21 the United States
Supreme Court upheld a Virginia statute requiring sterilization by sal-
pingectomy of certain mental inmates found afflicted with an hereditary
form of insanity or imbecility. To the argument that the statute applied
only to the small number of persons within institutions and not to the
multitudes outside, the Court replied: "But the answer is that the law
does all that is needed when it does all that it can, indicates a policy,
applies it to all within the lines, and seeks to bring within the lines all
similarly situated so far and so fast as its means allow."22
The North Carolina reporting statute could not feasibly be made to
apply to persons who have not sought treatment. However, section 20-17.1
does not apply to many persons who do seek treatment because it does
not require physicians to report those persons who undergo treatment
for alcoholism, drug addiction, or mental problems privately in the
doctors' own offices. In all likelihood, those individuals who would escape
detection through operation of the statute by seeking such treatment are
not among the lower income classes. If this probability can be demon-
strated, an argument can be made that there is discrimination in favor of
the wealthy.23 This discrimination is not of much significance, however,
2-274 U.S. 200 (1927).
-Id. at 208. In Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 542
(1942), the Court approved Buck but struck down the Oklahoma Habitual Crim-
inal Sterilization Act because that law unreasonably excepted prisoners convicted
of embezzlement while applying to those convicted of larceny.
3 Cf. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) ; Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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if it can be authoritatively said that institutionalized patients are in much
greater need of treatment that those treated outside institutions.
Excluding the possibility of an attack on the statute on the theory of
discrimination based upon individual wealth, an argument under the equal
protection clause that persons being treated privately by physicians are
excluded from the reporting provisions is almost certain to fail. In addi-
tion to the strong barrier that Buck poses to such an argument is the
familiar rule in equal-protection cases that a state need not attempt to
solve all of the problems of the same kind within reach of its police powers
while eradicating some of them.24 Nevertheless, since the risk to highway
safety presented by non-institutionalized patients may be comparable to
the risk presented by those confined for treatment, the statute should be
amended to require reporting by doctors of all persons being treated for
the conditions set out in the present law. A possible constitutional attack
on the present reporting provisions is colorable at best,2 and the statute
could readily be expanded to apply to an even greater number of persons.
Some members of the medical profession have raised objections to
the statute's provisions for reporting.20 The required disclosures interfere
with the physician-patient relationship and force the doctor to become,
in effect, an agent of the state. However, the only rational objection is
that the therapeutic relationship may be impaired, not that breach-of-
confidence actions by patients will be asserted against physicians who obey
the law. Immunity is specifically granted by the statute,27 and the legal
requirement of disclosure is a traditional defense to such suits. 8
Mandatory reporting by physicians of information acquired in the
course of treatment is hardly a novel concept. Many states require doctors
and other persons to report the discovery of various conditions and
" See Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
"The patient's right to privacy in his relationship with his physician prob-
ably is not a "relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several
fundamental constitutional guarantees." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
485 (1965). Confidential communications between a physician and patient were
not privileged at common law. State v. Martin, 182 N.C. 846, 849-50, 109 S.E.
74, 76 (1921); C. DEWITT, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN PHYSICIAN
AND PATIENT 10 (1958). Only about two-thirds of the states have conferred the
privilege by statute. R. SLOVENKO, PSYCHOTHERAPY, CONFIDENTIALITY, AND
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION 15-16 (1966).
"N.C. Neuropsychiatric Ass'n, Newsletter, Nov. 1969.
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-17.1(e) (Supp. 1969).
"8Note, Medical Practice and the Right to Privacy, 43 MINN. L. REV. 943,
954 (1959).
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diseases. 20 North Carolina requires reporting of venereal disease,3° in-
flammation of the eyes of newborn infants,31 and certain other diseases
designated by the State Board of Health to be reportable. 2 Thus, there
is ample precedent for mandatory reporting under the statute. There is
no conflict with medical ethics:
A physician may not reveal the confidences entrusted to him in
the course of medical attendance, or the deficiencies he may observe
in the character of patients, unless he is required to do so by law or
unless it becomes necessary in order to protect the welfare of the in-
dividual or of the community.33
To the extent that the requirement of disclosure interferes with treat-
ment and thus is detrimental to the patient, a valid objection is raised.
Due to the unique intimacy between doctor and patient attained in
psychiatric treatment, the confidential relationship is an especially essential
element of the practice of psychiatry.34 The success of therapy in psychi-
atric and related treatment may be jeopardized by mandatory disclosures
of the sort required by the North Carolina statute; this danger must be
weighed heavily against the social value of reporting. However, patients
treated outside institutions are not reportable under the present law; so
many psychiatric patients are not affected. If amendment of the law to
make the reporting requirements applicable to the non-institutionalized
patient is envisioned, perhaps consideration should also be given to
softening the requirements concerning all those being treated by psychi-
atrists. For example, equally satisfactory traffic-safety results might be
obtained by requiring psychiatrists to report only those patients that
they determine under broad statutory guidelines to be hazardous drivers.
Another valid objection to the statute is that some unsafe drivers,
2'E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-202 (1967) (eye inflammation in newborn chil-
dren); MINN. STATS. § 144.68 (Supp. 1969) (malignant disease); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 23-5-4 (hearing defects in children), § 23-5-5 (occupational
diseases), §23-11-6 (venereal diseases) (1968); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN.
§ 26-10-10 (1967) (child abuse). For a more complete list of applicable statutes,
see Note, Medical Practice and the Right to Privacy, 43 MINN. L. REv. 943,
953-54 (1959).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130-95 (1964).
31 Id. § 130-107.
"Id. § 130-81.
"AMA, OPINIONS AND REPORTS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL § 9, at 55 (1969)
(Principles of Medical Ethics).
"J . ROBITSCHER, PURSUIT o- AGREEMENT, PSYCHIATRY & THE LAW 230
(1966); R. SLOVENKO, PSYCHOTHERAPY, CONFIDENTIALITY, AND PRIVILEGED COMf-
MUNICATION 40-44 (1966).
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fearing loss of driving privileges, may possibly be discouraged from seek-
ing necessary treatment. It is conceivable that the driver posing the highest
risk to society, who faces almost certain loss of his license if reported,
riight forego treatment, continue to drive as his condition worsens, and
eventually kill himself and others. If he had sought treatment, he might
have improved or been cured. This assumption may be purely speculative
and is founded on the presumption that the patient avoiding treatment
because of the law is aware of its existence. In fact, the general public
probably is not aware of the law. Nevertheless, the risk that some, and
perhaps many, drivers with reportable problems will be discouraged from
seeking needed medical help must be weighed in any evaluation of section
20-17.1.
In conclusion, the statute appears to be a valid exercise of the power
of the state to protect the motoring public, pedestrians, and the affected
individuals. However, to avoid possible constitutional defects and to
achieve fully the policy behind the legislation, the present law may need to
be broadened to require reporting of all patients possessing the enumerated
characteristics whether they are institutionalized or not. Moreover, it
would be desirable for some concessions to be made in the area of psychi-
atric treatment. Finally, in view of the present reporting rate, the
appropriate penalty provisions85 should be utilized to bring about full
compliance.
JAMES E. CLINE
Poverty Law-Is a Search Warrant Required for Home Visitation
by Welfare Officials?
The fact that public assistance is a statutory right means, therefore,
that it is subject to conditions imposed by the Legislature. . . . It
means that the Legislature may require that the applicant waive his
right to privacy to permit a thorough investigation of his eligibility
for public assistance. It means that the applicant must open his home
to admit representatives of the Welfare Department to enter and to
observe. . . [I]f he refuses to submit and refuses to permit such
infringement upon his right to privacy, then he may not exercise his
right to receive public assistance.'
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-35 (1965) provides that it is a misdemeanor to violate
any of the article's provisions, which is punishable by a fine up to five-hundred
dollars or by imprisonment for not more than six months.
1 Ruebhausen & Brim, Privacy and Behavioral Research, 65 CoLum. L. Rnv.
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